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Abstract 
Seeing a face gaze at an object elicits rapid attention shifts towards the same object. We 
tested whether gaze cuing is predictive: do people shift their attention towards objects others 
are merely expected to look at? Participants categorized objects while a face either looked at 
this object, at another object, or straight ahead. Unbeknownst to participants, one face would 
only look at drinks and the other at foods. We tested whether attention was drawn towards 
objects “favoured” by a face even when currently looking straight ahead. Indeed, while gaze 
expectations initially had a disruptive effect, participants did shift attention to the faces’ 
favoured objects once learning had been established, as long as emotional expressions had 
indicated personal relevance of the object to the individual. These data support predictive 
models of social perception, which assume that predictions can drive perception and action, 
as if these stimuli were directly perceived.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: Patric Bach's work was supported by the Economic and Social 
Research Council grant number ES/J019178/1. We thank Steven P. Tipper, University of 
York, for helpful comments during data collection and interpretation. 
 
  
   Page 3 of 17 
Looking ahead: 
Anticipatory cueing of attention to objects others will look at 
Humans routinely track what other people know, want and feel, for a large number of 
individuals, without being explicitly aware of it (e.g., Schneider, Bayliss, Becker & Dux, 
2012). A key process in this ability is the human tendency to follow others’ gaze. Seeing a 
face look at an object causes a rapid, spontaneous shift of spatial attention in the observer 
towards the same target (Driver et al., 1999; see Frischen, Bayliss & Tipper, 2007, for 
review). By synchronizing attention across interaction partners, this ‘gaze cueing’ effect may 
underpin, at least in part, mankind’s remarkable ability for social learning, cooperation, and 
communication. Conversely, disruptions of this process may underlie some of the social 
difficulties in autism spectrum and related conditions (Baron-Cohen et al., 1995). 
The present study tests whether gaze cueing is predictive. Do we just follow the overt 
gaze of other people, or do we also routinely shift our attention towards what we expect other 
people will look at? Everyday behaviour is ripe with such anticipatory attention shifts, where 
people’s attention is guided by the relevance an object has, not to themselves, but to their 
interaction partners. Parents report that their attention is often drawn to objects (diggers, 
tractors, princesses and sweets) that their children would like. People helpfully point out 
objects others are looking for, and, when shopping, they have a knack of finding items that 
their friends would like.  
Such predictive gaze cueing effects emerge naturally from recent hierarchical 
feedback models of perception (Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Clarke, 2013). In such models, 
perception is not only driven by bottom-up sensory information, but is directly informed by 
prior knowledge about forthcoming events. In many cases, these predictions can “stand in” 
for what is actually observed, and induce perceptual biases. For example, people misperceive 
the disappearance point of a moving object further along the trajectory than it really was 
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(Freyd & Finke, 1984). These predictions of future motion are guided by one’s assumptions 
about the external forces acting on the object (cf. Hubbard, 2005) and are integrated, in a 
Bayesian manner, with actual stimulation (e.g., Roach, McGraw & Johnson, 2011). In the 
social domain, it has been shown that heads appear to be rotated further if their gaze suggests 
a looking goal in this direction (Hudson, Hung-Liu, & Jellema, 2009). Hands are perceived 
closer to an object when the observer anticipates a reach and further away if they anticipate a 
withdrawal (Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis & Bach, under review), and observers more speedily 
identify actions an individual typically carries out with an object, compared to actions that are 
equally likely but typical for someone else (Schenke, Wyer, & Bach, under review).  
These findings provide initial evidence that people constantly predict others’ future 
behaviour and that these predictions can, to some extent, stand in for sensory information, as 
if these stimuli were directly perceived. Here, we test, for the first time, whether observers 
make such predictions about others’ gaze, and whether these gaze predictions lead to similar 
attentional shifts as directly perceived gaze. Prior research has provided suggestive evidence 
for this idea. For example, gaze cueing can be elicited not only by directly perceived gaze but 
merely by the belief that a person looks at an object (Teufel et al., 2010). Moreover, Frischen 
and Tipper (2006) have reported that, when re-encountering a face one has seen before, 
attention is guided not only by the face’s current gaze, but by its gaze in the previous 
encounter. Frischen and Tipper interpreted this as a recall of the observer’s own prior 
attentional state, but it might also reflect an anticipatory coding of gaze (cf. Bayliss & Tipper, 
2006). The person in the photograph had been looking left so we predict the photograph to 
show the same gaze when seen again.  
To test whether gaze expectations can induce such anticipatory gaze cueing, we 
adapted the standard gaze cueing paradigm. In each trial, participants saw one of two faces in 
the middle of two objects. A target appeared on one of the objects and participants indicated, 
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in a speeded response, whether the object was a food or a drink. In half the trials, the face 
would gaze – and smile – at one of the two objects just prior to the cue. Participants were 
instructed to ignore these gaze shifts, and we manipulated, unbeknownst to participants, 
which objects the two faces would look at. One face would only look and smile at drinks, and 
the other at foods. According to prior work, these gaze shifts should involuntarily direct 
attention to the gazed at object, rendering it easier to identify.  
The key question is whether people form gaze expectations about the two individuals, 
such that attention would shift towards their favoured object, even when the individuals 
looked straight ahead. Participants should then more quickly identify objects the face would 
typically gaze at, compared with objects it typically looks away from, specifically in the 
second half of the experiment, when participants have learned the relationships between faces 
and objects. Such an effect could not be explained by a mere reactivation of the observer’s 
prior attentional state. Overall, both faces equally often looked left and right, and their 
favoured objects were seen equally often in both locations. Finding gaze cueing effects 
towards the faces’ favoured objects would therefore reveal an anticipatory cueing of attention 
guided by predictions about the other individuals’ behaviour. 
Method 
Participants  
Sixty-two students from Plymouth University (18 to 52 years, 14 male) took part. 
Sample size was determined by a power analysis conducted on pilot data (see supplementary 
material). For half of the participants, the presented faces were cartoon faces and for the other 
half real face photographs. Cartoon faces are typically more effective in evoking gaze shifts, 
most likely because their visual simplicity facilitates cue extraction (e.g., Hietanen & 
Leppänen, 2003) and are therefore the most powerful test of the experimental hypothesis. 
Face photographs, in contrast, allow us to test whether any effects generalize to more realistic 
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face representations that more plausibly represent different individuals. Two participants, one 
from each group, were excluded because they made more than 10% errors.  
 
--- Figure 1 about here --- 
 
Material and apparatus 
All participants completed the Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin, & Clubley, 2001). The experiment proper was administered via Presentation 
(Neurobehavioral systems, version 14.9), on a Windows XP SP3 1280x1024 32 bit colour 
17” display. Stimuli were assembled from 25 images: a fixation cross (the ‘+’ symbol in 
Microsoft’s Trebuchet font), four colour photographs each of foods (orange, cupcake, apple 
and hotdog) and drinks (cola can, orange juice, milkshake and coffee) and cartoon and 
photograph versions of a male and a female face. The faces could either look straight ahead 
with a neutral expression, blink (eyes closed) with a neutral expression, or smile while 
looking left or right (Figure 1).  
Design and Procedure 
The participants were seated roughly 60 cm away from the monitor. They filled out 
the Autism Quotient, were given verbal and on screen instructions, and then completed 16 
practise trials. The experiment proper consisted of 256 trials. Participants were allowed to 
press ‘p’ at any point to take a break.  
Each trial started with a fixation cross (400 ms). After a brief blank (600 ms), one of 
two faces appeared in the middle of the screen, with a food item and a drink on either side 
(locations counterbalanced across trials). The face looked straight ahead with a neutral 
expression for a random time interval between 500 and 1100 ms. and then blinked for 100 
ms. The next image showed the face with eyes open, in 50% of the trials looking straight 
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ahead with a neutral expression, or smiling and looking at one of the objects in the other 
50%. One face would always look at the drinks and never at foods, while the other face 
showed the opposite behaviour (counterbalanced between participants). After 400 ms, a blue 
square appeared on one object and participants categorised this object as either a drink or a 
food by pressing either ‘h’ or the space bar. This image was presented until participants made 
a response or a maximum trial time of 4 seconds had passed. Feedback was given for error 
and timeouts reminding participants of the key assignment.  
After the experiment, participants were asked whether they noticed a pattern in the 
stimuli; none did and several expressed surprise when the manipulation was revealed. 
Results 
As during piloting (supplementary material), trials (1.7% in total) were excluded if 
they contained: responses before or after the response interval, responses with uncertain 
presentation timing (> 10 ms.), or responses with RTs beyond 3 standard deviations from the 
participant’s mean in the straight or sideways gaze trials. As participants initiated pauses 
themselves, trials following or preceding pauses were also excluded. Participants with AQ 
scores in the clinical range (>32) would have been excluded though none did.  
Data were analysed separately for the gaze towards object and gaze straight trials. The 
gaze trials tested whether our paradigm evoked the expected gaze cuing effects, but do not 
say anything about gaze expectancies, as the faces looked at their favoured object in all of 
these trials. In contrast, the trials with straight gaze measured gaze expectancies, and whether 
attention is directed towards the favoured object even when the face looks straight ahead.  
Regular gaze cueing 
We first confirmed that our paradigm elicited the typical gaze cueing effects. We 
analysed the gaze towards object trials with a 2X2 mixed-factors ANOVA with Object 
(looked at, not looked at) and Block (1, 2) as repeated measures factors and Group (cartoon 
   Page 8 of 17 
faces, photographs) as the between subjects factor. The analysis of RTs (Table 1) only 
revealed a main effect of Object F(1,58)=90.8, MSE=1563; p<.001, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.610, but no other 
effects (Fs<1). Participants more quickly categorized a looked-at object than a not looked-at 
object, in both block one, F(1,58)=54.7; MSE=1248; p <0.001, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.486) and block two, 
F(1,58)=58.6; MSE=1259; p<.001, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.502). The analogous analysis of error rates (Table 1) 
revealed no effects (Fs<1), but an interaction of Object by Group, F(1,58)=13.3; p<.001, 
MSE=.019;  𝜂𝑝
2=0.19. For cartoon faces, participants made more errors for not looked-at-
objects, and for photographs for looked-at objects (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Regular gaze cueing effects for both response times and error rates. Values in 
brackets show the standard deviation in the condition. 
 Response Times (ms.) Error rates (%) 
Group looked at not looked at looked at not looked at  
Cartoons 509 (83) 562 (89) 3.3 (2.9) 5.2 (3.6) 
Photographs 544 (116) 587 (114) 4.4 (3.8) 2.8 (2.5) 
 
Anticipatory gaze cueing 
The crucial test was whether observers would also shift their attention to the expected 
object when the face looks straight ahead. RTs and Error rates in the straight gaze trials were 
analysed with the same ANOVA as the regular gaze trials, with the Object factor now coding 
whether the target appeared on the object the face typically looked at, or the other object.  
The analysis of RTs revealed neither an effect of Object, F<1 nor of Block, 
F(1,58)=3.5, MSE=2052, p=.066, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.057, but a significant interaction between both 
factors, F(1,58)=12.116, MSE=761, p=.001, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.173. Step down ANOVAs revealed that, in 
Block 1, participants were faster to categorize typically looked away from objects compared 
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to typically looked at objects, F(1,58)=6.2, MSE=822, p=.015, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.097, while Block 2 
revealed the expected pattern of faster responses for objects the person typically looks at, 
F(1,58)=4.9, MSE=834, p=.031, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.078. Group did not interact with any factor (Fs<1). 
The Object by Block interaction was replicated in the photograph group, F(1,29)=4.6, 
MSE=874, p=.040, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.138, and the cartoon group F(1,29)=8.0, MSE=647, p=.008, 
𝜂𝑝
2=0.217, when analysed separately. 
 
--- Figure 2 about here --- 
 
The analysis of error rates revealed a significant effect of Block, F(1,58)=6.7, 
MSE=.001, p=.012, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.104, with fewer errors in the second half of the experiment. 
Importantly, there was a significant effect of Object, F(1,58)=4.7, MSE=001, p=.034, 
𝜂𝑝
2=0.075, but no interaction, F<1. Step-down ANOVAs revealed that participants made 
fewer errors for typically gazed at objects in Block 2, F(1,58)=4.863, MSE=.001, p=.031, 
𝜂𝑝
2=0.077, but not in Block 1, F(1,58)=1.065, MSE=.001, p=.306, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.18. Group did not 
interact with any other factor (Fs<2.7). 
A separate study (see Supplementary Experiment) tested whether the same effects are 
also obtained when the observed faces did not smile but showed a neutral expression when 
looking at the objects, but was otherwise identical. While this study replicated the regular 
gaze cuing effects, with faster responses for looked at compared to not looked at objects, all 
predictive gaze cuing effects in both RTs and Error Rates were eliminated, all F<1.1. Indeed, 
across experiment comparisons revealed that the predictive gaze cuing effects in the main 
experiment differed significantly from this control experiment, both for the RT interaction, 
F(1,118)=10.5, MSE=722, p<.002, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.082, and the error rate effect in Block 2, 
F(1,118)=4.150, MSE=0.004, p<.044, 𝜂𝑝
2=0.034. 
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General Discussion 
We tested whether gaze cueing of attention is driven only by bottom-up gaze cues, or 
whether it is predictive, and is guided by the gaze a person is only expected to show. 
Participants categorized objects while a face either looked at this object, at another object, or 
straight ahead. Unbeknownst to participants, we manipulated the looking behaviour of the 
faces, such that one face (e.g. the male) would only look at foods and the other (the female) 
only at drinks. We tested whether participants would derive implicit gaze expectations from 
these contingencies, and whether these expectations would elicit similar shifts of attention 
even when the faces looked straight ahead.  
As predicted, the second half of the experiment, after participants had learned the 
individuals’ looking behaviours, revealed such anticipatory cueing effects. Participants 
categorized objects more quickly and reliably if these objects were typically looked and 
smiled at by the individual, compared to the objects that they typically looked away from. 
These anticipatory shifts of attention were observed even though (1) neither the face, nor 
gaze direction was task relevant, (2) gaze direction did not predict the location of the task-
relevant object, and (3) across faces, all objects were looked at equally often. The data 
therefore indicate that, by Block 2, observers had implicitly formed internal models of the 
individuals’ gaze behaviour, which then directed attention towards the expected object, as if 
the gaze shift were directly observed. Gaze cueing of attention is therefore not only driven by 
bottom-up sensory information, but also by expectations about others’ gaze, supporting the 
assumption that predicted stimulation can drive action and cognition, as if the event was 
directly observed (cf. Clarke, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009).  
We had expected that these effects would slowly build up, and that anticipatory gaze 
cueing was small or absent in the first half of the experiment. However, an unexpected 
pattern emerged in these earlier trials. Participants were slower to identify objects that the 
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other person typically looked at, compared to objects they typically looked away from. The 
shift from negative to positive gaze cueing effects over the experiment was replicated in both 
the face photograph and cartoon faces groups. It suggests that participants learn about the 
predictive relationships between individuals, objects and gaze very quickly. At the start, these 
predictions have a disruptive effect. Only when fully established do they guide attention 
similarly as directly observed gaze. 
Although not predicted, such negative effects are in line with hierarchical feedback 
models of perception. These models conceptualize perception as an integration of sensory 
information and top-down predictions, such that predictions can “stand in” for what was 
actually perceived (Clarke, 2013; Friston & Kiebel, 2009). These assimilative effects of prior 
information are, however, typically only observed when the stimuli are not directly attended 
(Kok et al, 2011). Attended stimuli may cause reverse effects and bias perception away from 
the predictions. Classic examples are visual after images, where observing – or even 
imagining – a movement to the left causes subsequent static images to be perceived as 
moving subtly to the right (Wade, Thompson & Morgan, 2014), and we have observed 
similar contrastive effects in motor activation when famous athletes were seen not 
performing their typical sports (Bach & Tipper, 2007; Tipper & Bach, 2010). In the same 
way, here, the negative cueing effects might emerge because the individual’s straight gaze is 
coded relative to the expected looking behaviour, causing a bias in the opposite direction. 
When, however, participants become more effective at diverting attention away from the 
distracting faces over the course of the experiment, these effects revert to positive ones, 
revealing the expected superposition of sensory information and prior expectations. Of 
course, at the moment, these considerations are speculative and need to be further verified. 
An interesting observation was that the predictive gaze cueing effects depended on 
the faces showing an emotional response when looking at the objects (see also Bayliss et al., 
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2009, 2010). In a separate experiment (Supplementary Material) – initially used for piloting, 
but increased to full sample size at the request of a reviewer –, we ran exactly the same 
procedure, but with the faces showing a neutral expression when looking at their objects. 
While the regular gaze cueing effects were identical across experiments, all predictive gaze 
cueing effects were now eliminated. This difference is striking given that predictive coding 
models do not necessarily distinguish between social and other effects on perception. This 
dependency on an emotional expression reveals a very much social coding of the individuals’ 
gaze, reflecting, perhaps, the mental states that the emotional expressions imply, or the 
emotional relevance the object has to the individuals (cf. Manera, Elena, Bayliss, & Becchio, 
2014). It is in line with the idea that internal models of other people do not only reflect their 
behaviours towards objects, but also the internal states these behaviours imply (Barresi & 
Moore, 1996). Our new data therefore provide first evidence for models suggesting that such 
top-down knowledge can be converted into concrete predictions of others’ gaze that drives 
one’s own attention system as if the gaze shifts were directly observed, as predicted by 
predictive coding of social perception (e.g., Kilner et al., 2007). 
An important question is whether the predictive effects on gaze cueing reflect explicit 
or implicit learning of the contingencies. This question was not central to the current 
hypotheses, but in a post-experiment screening none of the participants reported awareness of 
the patterns. This unawareness probably emerges because the faces of the individuals were 
task irrelevant and there was no relationship between gazed-at-object and object-to-be-
categorized. Indeed, many participants stated that they attempted to ignore the faces 
altogether. Moreover, in a prior study, we showed that participants often remain unaware of 
similar relationships between individuals, situations and behaviours (Schenke, Wyer & Bach, 
under review), even when alerted, several times during the experiment, that such a pattern 
was present. Together with the reports of our participants, these data indicate that the typical 
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behaviour of others is learned in a largely implicit manner, but nevertheless directly affects 
perception and guidance of attention. 
Conclusions 
Gaze cueing of attention is not only driven by bottom-up sensory information, but also 
by prior expectations about what other individuals will look at in a given situation. Because 
gaze cueing is central for joint attention, learning from others and fluent social interaction, 
such a predictive mechanism could have far reaching impacts on social interaction, allowing 
people to attend to what other’s will look at in the future or direct their attention to objects 
that are relevant to their interaction partners. Future experiments need to explore the role of 
the implicit/explicit nature of the predictions, and why, in the first half of the experiment, 
predictions can give rise to paradoxical negative gaze cueing effects. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Schematic of the trial sequence. After a fixation cross (400 ms.) and a blank screen 
(600 ms.), participants saw either a male or female face flanked by a drink and a food item. 
After a random time interval (between 500 to 1100 ms.), the face blinked (for 100 ms.). 
When the eyes opened again, the face either looked straight ahead (not shown) or at one of 
the two objects, and a blue square marking the object to be categorized appeared 400 ms. 
later. We manipulated the gaze behaviour of the two faces such that, if looking sideways, one 
face would only look at drinks and the other only at food (counterbalanced between 
participants). 
Figure 2. Response times (left panels) and Error Rates (right panels) in the straight gaze 
trials, for the cartoon faces (top row) and real faces (bottom rows) groups separately. In each 
figure, the left two bars show the data for the first half of the experiment, and the right two 
bars show the data for the second half of the experiment. The black bars show categorization 
response for objects that are typically looked at by the shown individual, and the white bars 
show objects that this individual typically looks away form. Error bars show the standard 
error of the mean. 
 
